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AIRPORT RESTRICTIONS: A DILEMMA OF
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND PROPRIETARY
CONTROL
WILLIAM PENNINGTON
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not
wander about the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only
by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the
hands of federally certified personnel and under an intri-
cate system of federal commands. The moment a ship
taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and de-
tailed system of controls.'
F EDERAL CONTROL OVER air travel is extensive, and
traditional police powers are not available as a means
for local control. 2 Federal control, however, does not ex-
tend to every aspect of air travel. If it did, whenever an
airport proprietor imposed a restriction on the users of a
facility, no matter how insignificant the effect, the mea-
sure would invade the federal government's domain. It is
not so simple. Although congressional regulation of air-
ports currently governs most aspects otherwise left to lo-
cal or proprietary control, the regulatory blanket
Congress has placed over air facilities is one with holes
intentionally left in it. While the areas left for control by
airport proprietors are small, the statutes governing the
proprietors' actions create a virtual minefield for the op-
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973)
(finding that the pervasive nature of federal regulation left no room for state
control).
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erators to traverse. One wrong step results in preemp-
tion; careful study ensures valid regulation.
This comment will demonstrate the extent to which air-
port proprietors may regulate their facilities in the face of
federal statutes. The first section will discuss the principal
statutes concerned with federal preemption of airport
regulation. The second section will discuss the develop-
ment of proprietary control beginning with the recogni-
tion that noise regulation is a legitimate area of
proprietary interest. The third section will discuss the
reasonable and nondiscriminatory limitations imposed on
any airport restrictions. The final section of the comment
will discuss the application of these limitations on propri-
etary restrictions.
It is important to note that while the case law and aca-
demic writings in this area are sparse, the opinions of the
courts in the few cases available are complex. The opin-
ions involve numerous issues, and the courts often engage
in a separate analysis of each issue. As a result, key cases
are used repeatedly throughout the comment in support
of different points. As litigation increases over the ability
of airport proprietors to set restrictions at their facilities,
more guidance will be available for determining how fed-
eral standards should be applied.
I. FEDERAL CONTROL
The key to understanding the federal preemption of
airport regulation lies in understanding the three main
statutes governing airport proprietors, and how each of
these statutes serves a separate function. Two statutes re-
quire charges or restrictions imposed by an airport opera-
tor to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory. The third
statute preempts local police powers that would otherwise
be available to states or cities for control of airport
nuisances.
A. Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Requirement
The first federal statute that affects airport proprietors
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is section 2210 of the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act of 1982. 3 This legislation requires any airport receiv-
ing federal subsidies to make its facilities available on
"fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimina-
tion."'4 Any regulatory statute implicitly asks the question
of who can enforce it. Section 2210 does not provide a
private right of action.
In Cort v. Ash,5 the Supreme Court set out four ques-
tions used to determine when a federal statute creates a
private right of action. First; does the statute create a fed-
eral right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent to create such a remedy?
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply a remedy for the plaintiff?
And fourth, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-
gated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to in-
fer a right based solely on federal law?6 When this test is
applied to section 2210 no private right of action is found
under the statute.7
3 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(1) (1988). The statute reads in part:
(a) Sponsorship
As a condition precedent to approval of an airport development
project contained in a project grant application submitted under this
chapter, the Secretary shall receive assurances, in writing, satisfac-
tory to the Secretary, that-
(1) the airport to which the project relates will be available for pub-
lic use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimina-
tion, including the requirement that (A) each air carrier using such
airport... shall be subject to such nondiscriminatory and substan-
tially comparable rates, fees, rentals, and other charges . . .as are
applicable to all such air carriers which make use of such airport and
which utilize similar facilities ....
Id.
, Id. For a discussion of two forms of federal intervention in airport user fees,
see Note, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE LJ. 319 (1983). The
two forms of intervention discussed in the Note are: (1) agreement by airports to
not discriminate in providing access to their facilities and (2) agreement by air-
ports to keep user fees at a reasonable level. Id. at 319.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
6 Id. at 78.
, Interface Group Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir.
1987). While the statute's language does support that it was enacted for the bene-
fit of air carriers, that language also suggests that Congress envisioned an alter-
nate enforcement scheme by the federal government inconsistent with a private
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Although there is no private right of action under sec-
tion 2210, airport proprietors still find that section 2210
severely limits their ability to impose landing and user
fees on tenants. Section 2210 places two restrictions on
proprietors imposing fees: it requires that those fees ac-
curately reflect the cost of operating the facility 8 and it re-
quires proprietors to expend their revenues for necessary
operational activities. 9 An airport operator can satisfy the
requirements of section 2210 by ensuring its regulations
are both reasonable and nondiscriminatory. These same
limits will play an important role in determining whether
a proprietor's restrictions are valid under other legislation
as well.10
right of action. Also, the legislative history of the statute refers only to a right of
air carriers to "consult" with the Secretary of Transportation and does not indi-
cate a private right of action was intended. Id.; see also Arrow Airways, Inc. v.
Dade County, 749 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding that airport tenants could
not bring a private action under section 2210 against Miami International Airport
even though new fees had caused a 632% increase in the airport's net income
over a five year period); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 658
F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that section 2210 merely imposes obliga-
tions on airport proprietors and does not provide plaintiffs with a private right of
action), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
Enforcement of section 2210 falls exclusively to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion. New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 169
(1st Cir. 1989). Also, the review of the Secretary's decisions under this statute is
based on the most deferential standard of review available: abuse of discretion.
Id.
8 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(9) (1988). The statute reads in part:
(a)(9) the airport operator or owner will maintain a fee and rental
structure for the facilities and services being provided the airport
users which will make the airport as self-sustaining as possible under
the circumstances existing at that particular airport, taking into ac-
count such factors as the volume of traffic and economy of collection
Id.
, Id. § 2210(a)(12). The statute reads in part:
(a)(12) all revenues generated by the airport, if it is a public airport,
... will be expended for the capital or operating costs of the airport
... the local airport system, or other local facilities which are owned
or operated by the owner or operator of the airport and directly and
substantially related to the actual air transportation of passengers or
property ....
Id.
10 For a discussion of how reasonableness and nondiscrimination determine if a
proprietary restriction is valid, see infra notes 71-173 and accompanying text.
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B. Prohibitions on Head Taxes
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.," was faced
with the question of whether a state or municipality could
impose a charge on each enplaning passenger at a local
airport. The Court found that this "head" tax was consti-
tutional so long as it did not discriminate against inter-
state commerce and travel,' 2  reflected a fair
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit
they were imposed,' 3 and was not excessive in relation to
the costs incurred by the authorities imposing the tax.1 4
The taxes imposed by the municipalities in this case met
those standards.15
11 405 U.S. 707 (1972). This case involved taxes imposed by two separate mu-
nicipalities on commercial airline passengers for the purpose of defraying costs of
airport construction and maintenance. Id. at 709. At Dress Memorial Airport in
Evansville, Indiana, a service charge of one dollar was assessed on each enplaning
passenger. Id. New Hampshire required its airports to charge each enplaning
passenger either fifty cents or one dollar depending on the gross weight of the
aircraft they were boarding. Id. at 710.
12 Id. at 717. In this case, the requirement of nondiscrimination was satisfied by
the fact that, while more travelers using the airport were engaged in interstate
flights rather than intrastate ones, the same tax was imposed on all of them. Id.
1" Id. at 717-18. The Court found the charges to reflect a "fair, if imperfect,
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed." Id. at
717. Although the taxes in question were imposed only on commercial airline
customers and not on other airport users such as general aviation passengers and
non-passenger airport users, the Court found such exceptions to be reasonable
since most airport users not directly taxed were taxed indirectly in one way or
another. These indirect taxes were chiefly in the form of rent paid by shops,
restaurants, and parking concessions that were passed on, at least in part, to pa-
trons. Also, passengers could be distinguished as a class because the boarding of
flights required the use of runway and navigational facilities not used by nonflight
activities. Id. at 717-18.
,- Id. at 719-20. The Court found that the fees imposed were not shown to be
excessive in relation to the costs incurred by the taxing authorities. In fact, no
evidence was offered to show that the revenues would not be used solely to cover
existing debt obligations. It was assumed the taxes imposed would be used by the
authorities to meet deficits in capital improvements at the airport. The Court
noted, however, that nothing in its opinion required that the funds from the tax
be earmarked for airport use so long as the funds received by airport authorities
did not exceed operational costs. Id.
15 Id. at 717. The Court also pointed out that "while state or local tolls must
reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical standard' relating to public expenditures, it is
the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central concern." (emphasis supplied) Id.
at 716.
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Congress reacted with hostility toward the decision, and
legislators felt that safeguards were needed to prevent ex-
cessive or discriminatory taxation.' 6 In response, Con-
gress passed the Federal Anti-Head Tax Act prohibiting
states from taxing persons traveling in air commerce.17
Additionally, Congress granted a private right of action
for passengers and airlines to challenge proscribed
taxes. 18
16 S. REP. No. 12, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1434, 1446. Part of the report reads:
The provision is in response to a situation which has been brought
about by [Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc.], upholding passenger head taxes enacted by New Hamp-
shire and by Evansville, Indiana, for "aviation-related purposes."
While this decision has invited state and local governments to enact
head taxes or fees on air travelers, the Court decision does not pro-
vide adequate safeguards to prevent undue or discriminatory
taxation.
Id. Two newspaper accounts were included to show the chaos and confusion the
collection of head taxes caused. One discussed the reaction to a two dollar tax
imposed on both arriving and departing passengers:
"That means at $4 each time, I'll be paying almost $40 to Philadel-
phia every year," he said. "They don't give me anything for it."
City Council adopted a new levy by a 15-0 vote May 25, [1972].
Because of Mayor Rizzo's campaign promise not to raise taxes, city
officials have billed the new tax a "user charge" instead of a tax.
"Whatever they call it, I think it stinks," said Robert Maler, a ticket
agent for American Airlines.
Id. at 1448 (citing the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, July 1, 1972).
'7 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513 (1988). The statute reads in part:
(a) No State ... shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge or other
charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce
or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the
sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, nothing in
this section shall prohibit a State ... from the levy or collection of
taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section,
including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales
or use taxes on the sale of goods or services; and nothing in this
subsection shall prohibit a State... owning or operating an airport
from levying or collecting reasonable rental charges, landing fees,
and other service charges from airport operators for the use of air-
-port facilities.
Id.
The private right of action granted by section 1513 is implied and not ex-
press. For a discussion of the tests for inferring a private right of action, see supra
notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The four tests for inferring a private right of
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The primary motive behind the Anti-Head Tax Act is to
prohibit states from directly or indirectly taxing passen-
gers engaged in air travel.' 9 At the same time, the act al-
lows a state to continue collecting normal property and
sales taxes.20  Further, the Act expressly provides that
states or their political subdivisions operating airports
may levy and collect rental charges and landing fees.2 '
But Congress has not imposed a total prohibition on user
fees. Instead, it specifically exempted "reasonable" user
fees. 2
The requirements of reasonableness and nondiscrimi-
nation found in section 2210 and in the Anti-Head Tax
Act create limits on an airport proprietor's ability to set
restrictions on air travel. The requirements of the Anti-
Head Tax Act, however, affect only fees and do not affect
non-monetary restrictions, such as airport access or land-
ing rights."
action are satisfied with respect to the statute. First, while the primary benefi-
ciaries of the statute are obviously air passengers, given the close relationship
between air traveler and air carrier, it is reasonable to assume a special benefit
attaches to carriers as well. Second, legislative intent suggests anticipation of pri-
vate actions. Air carriers are logical plaintiffs in an action under the statute since
they, and not the lone traveler, have the financial incentive to challenge state
taxes. Third, private enforcement furthers the purpose of the act. Finally, since
the statute forbids state action, it is states that will be defendants. This prohibi-
tion of state action makes the area regulated by the statute especially suited for
federal action. Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 16.
19 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(a).
20 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(b). The extent to which a state may go in the levying
of sales taxes is questionable. For example, the State of Hawaii, acting under its
state powers and not its proprietary powers, imposed a tax on gross receipts of
airlines operating inside the state. The Supreme Court struck down the tax as a
violation of section 1513. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Haw.,
464 U.S. 7 (1983).
2 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(b); see Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County of Pit-
kin, 674 F. Supp. 312, 320 (D. Colo. 1987) (granting a motion to dismiss based on
section 1513 preempting local regulation). Section 1513 provides that "En]othing
in this section shall prohibit a State . . . from . . . collecting reasonable rental
charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the
use of airport facilities." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(b).
22 Rocky Mountain Airways, 674 F. Supp. at 320. For a short discussion of the
legislative history of section 1513 and its function in aiding the flow of interstate
commerce, see Note, supra note 4, at 322 n.23.
2 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(a). The Anti-Head Tax Act only prohibits a state
from collecting charges and does not mention any other limitation. Id.
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Currently, congressional hostility toward head taxes
may be decreasing. Since 1970, an airport trust fund fi-
nanced by a federal surcharge on passenger airline tickets
has been theoretically available to airports to finance facil-
ity improvement projects.2 4 This trust fund, however, is
largely off limits for such projects because its $7.6 billion
size helps disguise the federal deficit. 25 Recognizing that
airports need a new source of funds for improvement
projects, Congress is considering legislation that would
allow medium and large airports to levy a "passenger fa-
cility charge" on tickets. In some cases, the new charge
could boost air fares by $12 for a round trip ticket. 6
Funds from the charges would be available to all
airports 2
The ticket charge plan has passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and, although the Senate has not acted on it,
eventual congressional approval seems inevitable. The
plan provides new revenue for airport improvement
projects while still paying homage to the Bush administra-
tion's now defunct pledge to not raise taxes. The fare in-
creases would technically be "user fees" or "tolls."2 8 In
any event, the new surcharge would be for the limited
purpose of financing facility improvements, and the
surcharge would be overseen by the Secretary of Trans-
portation.29 Other fees imposed by airport proprietors
would still have to meet the "reasonableness" require-
ment of the Anti-Head Tax Act.
C. Proprietary Powers Versus Police Powers
Analysis of the final statute concerning federal preemp-
tion emphasizes the distinction between proprietary pow-
ers and police powers. Police powers enable the
24 Mills, House OKs Passenger Fees to Boost Airport Funding, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.,
Aug. 4, 1990, at 2510.
25 Id.
2c Id.; see also H.R. 5170, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
27 Mills, supra note 24, at 2510.
' Id. at 2511.
29. Id. at 2510.
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government to legislate in broad areas of scope including
economics, the environment, morality, law and order, and
peace and quiet.30 The importance of this distinction be-
tween proprietary and police powers arises in those nu-
merous instances where a state or municipality is also the
proprietor of an airport. Four criteria determine whether
an airport is actually run by state or municipality or is
merely located within a political subdivision's borders:
ownership, operation, promotion, and the ability to ac-
quire necessary approach easements."' When a state or
municipality exceeds its inherent rights to control an en-
terprise located within its jurisdiction and meets the re-
quirements for proprietorship, it no longer relies solely
on its own police powers to regulate the enterprise. His-
torically, the Supreme Court has held the police powers of
a state in high regard and supercedes those powers only
when Congress exhibits a clear and manifest purpose to
do so. 3 2
Section 1305 of the Federal Aviation Act of 19583'
so Blackman & Freeman, The Environmental Consequences of Municipal Airports: A
Subject of Federal Mandate?, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 375, 385-86 (1987).
3 San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1317 (9th Cir.
1981). In this case, the court was faced with the legality of a curfew imposed by a
state statute on aircraft flights. Id. at 1308. The court found that the state was not
the airport proprietor since it had granted a specific port district power to acquire
air easements, operate an air terminal, levy taxes, and make contracts. The port
district, and not the state, therefore, was the true proprietor. Id. at 1317.
32 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973).
3 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988). The statute reads in part:
(a) Preemption
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State
or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other
political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air
transportation.
(b) Proprietary powers and rights
(1) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or any
interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States as
the owner or operator of an airport served by any air carrier certified
by the Board to exercise its proprietary powers and rights.
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speaks directly to the problem of conflicting federal regu-
lation and state police power limitations. The statute al-
lows a municipality to act as a proprietor of an airport.
The same legislation, however, implicitly denies the right
of a municipality to exert its police powers over an air-
port.3 4 Therefore, the authority of a state or municipality
as a landlord is not necessarily identical to its police
power. 5
While section 1305 allows local authorities to operate
airports as proprietors, the grant is limited. Furthermore,
it is subject to restrictions if the local government invades
the area reserved for federal interest. 36 Proprietary pow-
ers do not exceed the federal government's grant of
power if the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 37
deems the restriction "reasonable.' '38 Reasonableness,
therefore, is the central inquiry under section 1305.
Id.
4 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 n.14. The case involved the legality of a
nighttime ban on jet aircraft takeoffs at Hollywood-Burbank Airport. No jet air-
craft could take off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. Id. at 625. The regulation af-
fected only one scheduled flight, an intrastate flight to Oakland departing every
Sunday at 11:30 p.m. Id. at 626. The court found state police powers insufficient
to uphold the ordinance. Id. at 640.
35 Id. at 636 n.14.
-6 New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 173. Speaking more to the point, the
court said, "In reducing federal economic regulation of the field to allow the
forces of free competition to rule the marketplace, Congress obviously did not
intend to leave a vacuum to be filled by the Balkanizing forces of state and local
regulations." Id.
37 Section 1305 creates no private right of action; enforcement of the statute is
left to the FAA. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 817 F.2d
222, 225 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). The court affirmed a
lower court dismissal of an action by the airline challenging a perimeter rule en-
acted at LaGuardia airport. Id. at 223. The airline attempted to bring a
Supremacy Clause challenge to the perimeter rule by alleging that the rule was
preempted by section 1305(a)(1). Id. at 225. The courts have allowed private
enforcement of section 1305 by circumventing the absence of a private right
through the use of the Supremacy Clause. "A claim under the Supremacy Clause
that a federal law preempts a state regulation is distinct from a claim for enforce-
ment of that federal law." Id. A claim under the Supremacy Clause asserts that a
federal statute has preempted local power to regulate an activity, whereas a pri-
vate action is a means of enforcing the substantive provisions of a federal law. Id.
at 225-26.
38 New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 173. The court found that the landing
fees imposed by the authority were unreasonable because of an improper cost
Therefore, reasonableness and nondiscrimination form
the standards for measuring the ability of airport proprie-
tors to set regulations.
II. PROPRIETARY CONTROL
A. Early Concessions: Noise Control
Section 1305 exempts proprietary powers and rights
from federal preemption. 9 Although the full extent of
this exception has not yet been established by either the
courts or Congress,4 ° the Supreme Court recognizes that
noise control is a necessary area excluded from federal ju-
risdiction and left to local authorities. In City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. , t the Court struck down a mu-
nicipal ordinance which imposed a curfew on jet aircraft
at a local airport. Although the Court refused to allow the
municipality to use its police powers to control airport
noise, it left open the question of whether a municipality
acting as an airport proprietor could impose noise regula-
tions.42 In reaching its decision, the Court noted both the
legislative history of section 1305 and a letter from the
Secretary of Transportation stating that airport owners
could "deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the ba-
sis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory. '4  Therefore, congressional intent
and administrative decisions were both reasons that noise
control was not believed to be preempted by federal
statutes.
The most important factor in recognizing noise control
methodology. Id. For a discussion of the cost methodology used by the authority,
see infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
-9 For a discussion of section 1305 and its application to local restrictions, see
supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
40 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 658 F. Supp. 952, 956
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006
(1988). The court traced legislative history and Supreme Court analysis on the
subject. For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 169-173 and accompanying
text.
41 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
42 Id. at 635 n.14.
43 Id. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra note 34.
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as a proprietary power, however, was the fact that public
entities had an obligation to compensate property owners
who lost land through inverse condemnation. 4 Property
owners had their property "taken" when excessive airport
noise prevented "the peaceful use and occupancy of
[their] residential land."'45 Courts therefore reserved for
the proprietor the right to protect itself from such liability
for damages caused by airport noise.46
The limits on the proprietor's ability to impose these
restrictions are that the restrictions be justified by the
need to respond to a noise problem affecting the airport
and that the restrictions not be unreasonable, arbitrary,
discriminatory, or a burden on interstate commerce. 7
Noise control, therefore, has been a long recognized ex-
ception to federal preemption under the reservation of
proprietary powers. The question still remains, though,
whether areas other than noise control fall under proprie-
tary control.
B. Other Recognized Areas of Proprietary Control
Early recognition that noise regulations were not feder-
ally preempted did not aid proprietors in establishing
other areas of proprietary control. In fact, the cases were
a hindrance. The early rulings gave proprietors protec-
tion from noise abatement suits with one hand while tak-
ing away additional proprietary powers with the other
hand.
When airport owners introduced controls to prevent
4 Note, Airport Use and Access, 4 NORTHROP U. L.J. 159, 161 (1983). The Note
discusses proprietary control of airport noise levels and the effect of federal limi-
tations on those controls. For a discussion of nondiscrimination and its impor-
tance in creating valid proprietary restrictions, see infra notes 148-173 and
accompanying text.
45 Id.
46 Ellett, The NationalAir Transportation System: Design by City Hall?, 53J. AIR L. &
CoM. 1, 6-7 (1987) (discussing the difficult friction created by an air travel system
that is growing but constrained by local and federal limitations on airports and
aircraft).
4 Id. at 7. An additional requirement is that the restrictions may not create an
exclusive right for any airport tenant. Id.
[56
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congestion or meet expenses of operation, airlines seized
on the language in the noise abatement suits and argued
that noise control was the sole proprietary power. 48 In-
deed, the airlines appeared to have case law authority on
their side. Courts had decided the noise abatement cases
narrowly, stating that the proper domain of the airport
proprietor was to establish permissible regulations re-
garding noise level and concluding that proprietors other-
wise had an "extremely limited role" in the system of
airport regulation. 49  The legislative history that the
courts often relied on in fashioning the noise control ex-
ception also supported the airlines' position since it ex-
plicitly mentioned only one proprietary power: noise
control. 50 Airport proprietors, however, continued at-
tempts to regulate their facilities.
When faced with the question of whether new restric-
tions were permissible under proprietary powers, the
courts eventually embraced an extension of the doctrine.
The question of whether an airport could deny landing
rights to airlines because of congestion problems
prompted one court to state that Congress did not intend
for its preemptive regulations to interfere with "long rec-
ognized powers of ... [proprietors] to deal with noise and
other environmental problems at the local level." 5' Comment-
ing on past noise abatement suits, another court stated
4a See Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 956. Judge Cannella's opinion ex-
panding the domain of proprietary powers was called "well-reasoned" 'by the ap-
peals court, suggesting that, beyond agreeing with the outcome of the case, they
would have decided it on identical grounds. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & NJ., 817 F.2d 222, 226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
Two excellent examples of cases narrowly holding that noise abatement is the
sole area of proprietary control are found in a pair of decisions involving the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey and proposed Concorde flights. British
Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter Concorde I]; British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 564 F.2d 1002,
1010-11 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Concorde II].
49 Concorde H1, 564 F.2d at 1010.
- For a discussion of the various legislative documents relied on by the court,
see Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 956. None of these documents mentioned
any proprietary power except the control of noise. Id.
51 Midway Airlines, Inc. v. County of Westchester, 584 F. Supp. 436, 440 n. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)(emphasis supplied).
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that cases do not reject the existence of proprietary pow-
ers outside noise control, but merely seek to insure that
proprietors do not regulate beyond an interest once it is
recognized.52 Using the same reasoning, another court
went on to hold that proprietors could issue reasonable
rules pertaining to noise level or other danger caused by air-
port users.53 It was also found that, while noise regulation
suits were the most prevalent civil actions, courts had ac-
cepted other proprietor-imposed regulations as valid ex-
ercises of power.54 Other areas besides noise abatement
were, therefore, available for proprietary control. The
two most likely areas for expanded proprietary control
were reducing airport congestion and imposing fees to
cover operating expenses of the facility.
1. Airport Congestion
While noise control may be the most litigated area of
proprietor restrictions, airport congestion is, perhaps, the
purest example of an exercise of proprietary power not
preempted by the federal government. One court found
that a proprietor's interest in regulating congestion was a
core function of the role of an airport manager.55 The
two principal methods that have been upheld to relieve
52 Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 956-57.
5- Midway Airlines, 584 F. Supp. at 441. The other dangers to which the court
referred are unclear, but the court did go on to uphold an airport's restriction of
additional flights pending a study on congestion problems at the facility. Id. at
441.
- Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 957. The main regulation mentioned by the
court was control of ground congestion. Id.
5" Id. at 957. The court stated:
[A]lthough questions of permissible noise regulation predominate in
the courts, other proprietor-imposed regulations are "presently ac-
cepted as valid exercises of proprietary powers." A proprietor's in-
terest in regulating ground congestion at its airports would appear
to be at the core of the proprietor's function as airport manager,
perhaps more so than the regulation of noise; and the ability of a
proprietor ... to allocate air traffic ... is important to the advance-
ment of this interest.
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airport congestion are perimeter rules 6 and peak-period
landing fees.57 Perimeter rules seek to relieve congestion
at an airport by restricting incoming and outgoing flights
to destinations within a certain distance of the facility.58
One writer called this type of restriction an effective
method of controlling congestion because the perimeter
rules shorten delays, ease overcapacity, and relieve the
strain on restricted physical facilities.59 Indeed, the courts
have concluded that perimeter restrictions, in the absence
of FAA regulations, are an effective and legitimate
method of controlling congestion. 6°
Peak-period landing fees are the second method used
by airport proprietors to control congestion at their facili-
ties. Peak-period landing fees seek to relieve congestion
during the time of the day when airlines are most likely to
schedule flights by making the times when the airport is
operating at a lower capacity more financially attractive.6 '
This method is a "reasonable, if not ideal, method of ef-
fecting the most efficient utilization of the air space and
Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 222 (affirming a lower court decision in favor of
a 1500 mile perimeter rule imposed at New York's LaGuardia airport).
37 Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 305 F. Supp. 93
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding the imposition of a twenty-five dollar take-off fee dur-
ing peak hours at New York's three major airports).
- See Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 953. In this case, the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey imposed a 1500 mile perimeter rule at the smallest of
its three airports: LaGuardia. The stated purpose of the rule was to reduce
ground congestion and maintain LaGuardia as a short and medium haul airport
by diverting long distance air traffic to Newark and Kennedy airports. Id.; see also
Comment, The Wright Amendment: The Constitutionality and Propriety of the Restrictions
on Dallas Love Field, 55J. AIR L. & COM. 1011 (1990) (authored by Eric A. Allen).
59 Cross, Airport Perimeter Rules, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 101, 115 (1988) (discussing pe-
rimeter rules at three major airports: National, Love Field, and LaGuardia).
-' Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 958. The court concluded: "[I]n the absence
of conflict with FAA regulations, a perimeter rule, as imposed by the Port Author-
ity to manage congestion in a multi-airport system, serves an equally legitimate
local need and fits comfortably within that limited role, which Congress has re-
served to the local proprietor." Id.
61 Levine, Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem, 12 LAw & ECON. 79, 91
(1969). Since an airline experiences only the average, rather than the marginal,
delay when conducting flights at peak hours, there is no economic incentive not to
maximize the number of flights during these times unless the proprietor imposes
a fee. Id.
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air time involved, '62 and its use has not been limited to
the United States.63
Courts will uphold perimeter rules and peak-period
fees as long as the restrictions are reasonable, nonarbi-
trary, and nondiscriminatory rules that advance the local
interest.' Aside from these constraints, an airport pro-
prietor is free to impose any system to control congestion
that it feels is necessary under the circumstances.
2. Operating Expenses
As a simple matter of economics, few owners would op-
erate an airport if they were unable to recapture most, if
not all, of their operating expenses. Thus, Congress pro-
vided that airport operators could maintain a fee and
rental structure that made the airport as self-sustaining as
possible.65 In interpreting Congress' provisions, courts
liberally construe what constitute "expenses" in provid-
62 R. ECKERT, AIR AND CONGESTION 56 (1972).
!3 See Landing Fees, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 11, 1985, at 20. The article
discusses the recent decision by Heathrow Airport to impose peak-hour fees on
users and grant discounts for small aircraft during off-peak periods. Id.
- Concorde 11, 564 F.2d at 1011. This decision actually dealt with a noise restric-
tion imposed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey that effectively
prohibited the landing of supersonic Concordes at any of the airports in the port
authority's jurisdiction. Id. at 1005. A lower court, however, adopted the lan-
guage concerning noise control as an appropriate test for any regulation. Western
Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 958. The actual test of the original decision reads:
The maintenance of a fair and efficient system of air commerce, of
course, mandates that each airport operator be circumscribed to the
issuance of reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory
rules .... We must carefully scrutinize all exercise of local power
under this rubric to insure that impermissible parochial considera-
tions do not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce or in-
hibit the accomplishment of legitimate or national goals.... And, of
course, our task of monitoring the proprietor's observance of the
strict statutory obligation to make his facility available for public use
on fair and reasonable terms, and without unjust discrimination ...
is especially critical. ...
Concorde I1, 564 F.2d at 1011.
(- 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(9) (1988). The statute provides that airport opera-
tors will maintain rental and fee structures that will make their facilities as self-
sustaining as possible considering the volume of traffic and the economy of col-
lecting revenues. Id.
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ing facilities and services to airport users.6 6
A problem arises, however, when the courts allow a
proprietor to liberally use its powers to cover expenses
through the imposition of fees. Because airports are natu-
ral monopolies 67 they obviously have the power to impose
monopoly prices in an unrestricted market. In order to
ensure that airports charge the price for their services that
would prevail in a competitive market, the power of air-
ports to charge for their services must be restricted.6"
Courts may allow airports to operate on at least a "break-
even" level, but the courts face the danger of granting the
airports too much latitude in the imposition of charges.
With no direct federal mandates other than section 2210,
section 1305, and the Federal Anti-Head Tax Act,6 9 the
courts have seized on the language in those statutes and
declared proprietor rental and service charges allowable
so long as such charges are "reasonable. ' 7  Reasonable-
ness, therefore, is again the standard by which airport
proprietor restrictions are measured.
- See Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367
(1 th Cir. 1987) (allowing off-site agencies to be charged a user fee based on
customers attributable to the airport); Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Dade County, 749
F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing proprietary increases in rent, fees, and
charges to cover reserves and debt requirements); American Airlines, Inc. v. Mas-
sachusetts Port Auth., 560 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1977) (allowing increased landing
fees to cover abandoned expansion projects and civic commitments).
67 For a discussion of natural monopolies, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY
AND APPLICArIONs 334-48 (1980). Briefly, natural monopolies are those busi-
nesses that can continually reduce their costs with each unit produced so that one
firm could supply the entire market at less cost than could two or more. Id. Air-
ports are natural monopolies since the construction of an airport facility involves
large unrecoverable costs. Id. The natural monopoly character of an airport
probably is present only in the actual runway and taxiway facilities and not for
terminals. Note, supra note 4, at 322 n.20.
- See Note, supra note 4, at 322.
- 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2210, 1305, 1513 (1988). For a discussion of these stat-
utes, see supra notes 3-38 and accompanying text.
70 Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County of Pitkin, 674 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D.
Colo. 1987) (stating that airports may impose rental charges, service charges, and
landing fees so long as those charges are reasonable).
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III. REQUIREMENTS OF AIRPORT RESTRICTIONS
When the federal statutes 71 and the recognized areas
not preempted from proprietary control 72 are examined,
two recurring requirements become apparent. First, the
restriction, whether it be a denial of airport access or a fee
imposed in the form of rent, service charge, or landing
cost, must be reasonable. Second, the restriction must be
nondiscriminatory in nature. Analysis of prior case law in-
terpreting these standards helps determine the extent to
which an airport proprietor may impose restrictions or
fees in light of these requirements.
A. Reasonableness
1. Costs Related to Expenses
The federal courts have addressed the question of
whether proprietary restrictions met the reasonableness
requirement in several important cases. The most recent
decision regarding the reasonableness of proprietor re-
strictions occurred in late 1989 in New' England Legal Foun-
dation v. Massachusetts Port Authority.73 In that case, the
Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), which owns and
operates Logan Airport in Boston, wanted to maximize
the efficient use of its facilities. It adopted a phased plan74
which began with a landing fee structure consisting of two
elements. The first element was a standard landing fee. 75
7 For a discussion of three federal statutes restricting the power of airport pro-
prietors to impose regulations at their facilities, see supra notes 3-38 and accompa-
nying text.
72 For a discussion of areas left open by federal statutes for proprietary control,
see supra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
73 883 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1989). The case is complicated and complex. The
court relies on numerous federal statutes, and the decision is based on the judg-
ments of both judicial and administrative judges. The number of plaintiffs in-
volved exceeds that which the most sadistic Civil Procedure professor would
include on a law school exam. The Court of Appeals itself said "this jurisdictional
dichotomy has created a confused class of circumforaneous litigants, wandering
perplexedly from forum to forum in search of remediation." Id. at 158-59.
74 Id. at 159. The plan was known as the "Program for Airport Capacity Effi-
ciency" (PACE) and was to go into effect July 1, 1988. Id. at 158-59.
75 Id. The landing fee was $91.78 for each aircraft. Id.
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The second element was an additional charge based on
aircraft weight. 76 Since the prior system had been based
on weight alone, the effect of this phase of the plan was to
increase drastically the cost per landing of small aircraft
while decreasing that of large aircraft.7 The resulting
formula departed from the traditional method of calculat-
ing landing fees, and several groups consisting of small
aircraft users brought a legal challenge against the fee
structure.78
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, following both judi-
cial and administrative hearings, decided the case against
Massport. The court determined that a "reasonable" fee
or charge was one which fairly and rationally reflects the
cost to comparably situated users79 and reasoned that a
76 Id. The second charge was $0.5417 per 1000 pounds of aircraft weight.
There was, however, an exception for aircraft operations meeting the criteria of
an "essential air service hub operation." These users were exempted from pay-
ment of the standard fee portion of the new landing fee and were merely required
to pay the pre-PACE charge of $25.00 per landing. Id. at 159 n.3.
77 Id. Massport's own estimates showed the landing fee of a typical small air-
craft would increase from $25.00 to $101.47; a 306% increase, while a typical
large aircraft would decrease from $823.99 to $450.31; a 45% reduction. Id.
There is, of course, the possibility that Massport attempted to "low-ball" its
figures of the increases small commuter aircraft and regional airlines would incur,
but it appears the estimates by the authority were close to accurate. The results of
a study by the Regional Airline Association (one of the plaintiffs in the litigation)
estimated only a 239% increase for those same aircraft. Hughes, RAA Estimates
239% Increase in Fees for Small Carriers Under Massport Plan, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 7, 1988, at 62.
78 New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 164. Logan's fee structure assigned
63% of the operation costs to items relating to landing operations which are fixed
and do not depend on the weight of the aircraft. The remaining 37% was attrib-
uted to cost categories related to aircraft weight. Traditional cost allocations,
however, allocate between 83% and 90% of the landing cost to aircraft weight
with the balance (between 10% and 17%) being attributed to landing operations.
Id.
79 Id. at 169. The court drew on the language of section 2210 of the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210 (1988). For a dis-
cussion of this act, see supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text. The court stated:
The Secretary is required by this statute to see that the project for
which federal grant funds are expended "will be available for public
use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination."
Although the statute does not define this terminology, [the act] re-
fers to "substantially comparable rates, fees ... and other charges
with respect to facilities directly and substantially related to provid-
ing air transportation." This provision also speaks of "substantially
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methodology having a nonarbitrary basis was essential.80
The court believed that Massport's fee structure was un-
reasonable because its methodology for allocating costs
was "not scientifically derived.""' Both the purpose and
effect of Massport's new fee structure was to move general
aviation aircraft away from Logan Airport. By failing to
accurately allocate both fixed and weight-related costs
and by allocating small aircraft a disproportionate share
of those costs, Massport violated its federal grant assur-
ances and imposed an unreasonable method of recover-
ing costs.8 2  The fee structure was not a sound
methodology but a system that went in search of an eco-
nomic theory to justify its existence. 3 Moreover, the plan
was revenue neutral, so it appeared to be an attempt to
modify conduct rather than recover operational costs.8 4
The court found the fee structure unreasonable, discrimi-
natory, and impermissible under the exception for propri-
comparable rules, regulations and conditions as are applicable to all
such airports and which utilize similar facilities .... " This appears
to us to establish as "reasonable" any fee or charge by the airport
proprietor which fairly and rationally reflects the cost to users that
are comparably situated.
New England Legal Found., 833 F.2d at 169.
mo New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 169.
81 Id. at 170. An administrative law judge reviewed Massport's fee structure
and determined it was based both on aircraft weight and on fixed operational
costs. It was not, however, scientifically derived because there was no basis for the
allocations made by Massport. Id. at 165-66.
82 Id. at 164. The court discussed an opinion by the Secretary of
Transportation:
By "unfairly and unreasonably" penalizing the smaller aircraft "by
allocating to them a disproportionate amount of airport costs," the
Secretary concluded that Massport "goes beyond a fair and reason-
able action to effect the legitimate recovery of costs, and clearly
crosses into an area which is inconsistent with [its] federal grant
assurances.
Id. at 166.
8- Id. at 164. The administrative law judge who made this conclusion felt it was
"difficult to walk away from the record of this case without inferring that the Mass-
port PACE Plan was conceived, orchestrated and implemented with the principal
objective of ridding Logan of small aircraft or severely curtailing their opera-
tions." Id. at 164.
84 Id.
etary rights and powers in federal preemption statutes.8 5
Although New England Legal Foundation demonstrates
there are limits on proprietary power to recover costs
when the fee structures used have no basis, the decision
may be narrow. Massport attempted to impose a monu-
mental change in its fee structure for the sole purpose of
shifting general aviation away from its facilities without in-
troducing any evidence that the shift was necessary. 6 In-
stead, Massport based its motives entirely on its power to
operate as a self-sustaining entity, and the court struck
down its new fee structure on the basis of the plan's lack
of scientific formulation.8 7 The court suggested that a sci-
entific formulation is one which employs traditional and
appropriate methods of cost allocation. 8
Massport's recent landing fee structure is not the first
to be struck down for lack of reasonableness. For in-
stance, in Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines,
Inc.,89 several airlines successfully defended their nonpay-
ment of a newly imposed fee schedule in a suit brought by
an airport proprietor.90 The authority had allocated its
annual costs among the different classes of airport users
895 Id. at 170.
86 Perhaps Massport's true motives can best be shown by the fact that only
Phase I of its new plan was involved here. Phase II, which had not come into
effect, would have set priority take-offs for large aircraft during peak hours.
Hughes, supra note 77, at 62. Massport's impetus, therefore, was not just in recov-
ering fees but in either reducing or eliminating small aircraft traffic.
Even more important to understanding the decision in this case, however, is the
fact that the Department of Transportation had political reasons for keeping air-
port authorities from adopting radical landing fee structures. Weiner, Massport
Suspends Logan's Higher Fees, FLYING, Mar. 1989, at 12. The more cynical might
agree with Massport's director that "the Reagan Administration decided to put its
muscle behind a small group of private plane owners who are concerned solely
with their own convenience." Id. at 13. No one could argue with the results,
however. During the time the fee structure was in effect, general aviation de-
creased 29% while seating capacity increased 10%. Also, on-time rates increased
from 69.5% to 86.4% and Logan's on-time rating among the busiest national air-
ports improved in rank from 21 to 12. Id.
87 New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 170.
88 Id.
89 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
- Id. at 1264-65.
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based on how much space each used.9' Concessionaires,
such as car rental agencies and the parking lot operator,
used much less space than the airlines, so the authority
attributed only a modest fraction of the airport's costs to
them. At the same time, the concessionaires paid rent far
in excess of the costs they imposed on the facility. 92 This
fee system yielded the airport a total income greater than
its costs. 93 The Seventh Circuit found that even though
excess income was being extracted from the concession
customers, the airlines were ultimately paying for that dif-
ferential through lower ticket prices needed to attract cus-
tomers to the airport.94 The resulting fee structure was
unreasonable since it did not fairly allocate the costs of
providing service to airport tenants.9 5
The fact that the authority might use excess funds for
airport development did not alter the court's reasoning.96
The airport might also use the funds for unnecessary
"gold-plating" improvements, resulting in a higher qual-
ity of airport services at a higher price than airline users
wanted.97 Therefore, the principal reason for the court's
finding of an unreasonable fee structure was that the cost
for airport services imposed on airlines and passengers
91 Id. at 1265. The classes of airport users were commercial aviation, general
aviation, and concessionaires. Id.
92 Id. The airport authority attributed costs of $100,000 to the car rental agen-
cies and $900,000 to the parking lot operator. Costs of $3,000,000 were attrib-
uted to the airlines. The airlines were required to pay landing fees and other
charges in amounts calculated to cover the costs allocated to them. Id.
93 Id. The airport received rental income from the car agencies and parking lot
totalling $3,500,000 but the costs they imposed on the facility were only
$1,000,000. Since the airport was charging the airlines enough to cover any costs
imposed by the carriers, the airport was receiving a windfall of $2,500,000. Id. at
1268.
- Id. The court also concluded that since the concessionaires recovered the
expense of high rent through increased prices to consumers, these customers also
paid the excess $2,500,000 received by the authority. Id.
95 Id. The court stated, "[Tihe result is an exaction that is wholly dispropor-
tionate to the costs to the airport of serving the airlines and their passengers, and
is therefore unreasonable under the state and federal statutes." Id.
Id. The court felt that the fee structure would be unreasonable even if all of
the income of the authority was put back into airport development. Id.
97 Id. The court came to this conclusion in discussing the possibility the author-
ity might use its excess revenues for the benefit of general aviation users. Id.
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greatly exceeded the costs those parties imposed on the
airport. 98 "Reasonableness" of landing fees, therefore, is
based on two independent tests: whether the airport pro-
prietor attempted to accurately reflect the amount of costs
attributable to the users on which they fall and whether
the fees are close approximations of the true cost of main-
taining the airport.
Island Aviation, Inc. v. Guam Airport Authority," best illus-
trates this two part test of "reasonableness." It also shows
that airport proprietors are capable of imposing a fee
structure that meets reasonableness requirements. In this
case, the Guam airport levied fees indirectly on passen-
gers for the purposes of airport development.100 The fees
consisted of two parts. First, the airport imposed a ser-
vice charge on aircraft operators to cover the costs of
maintaining a Sterile Room Holding Area. The airport
based this fee on the number of passengers processed.
Second, the airport imposed an Arrival Facility Service
Charge on aircraft operators. This charge covered the
costs of providing arrival facilities based on the number of
98 Id. at 1271. In a concurring opinion, Judge Flaum stated, "[Tihe allocation
of costs among users is a component of reasonableness." Id. at 1274 n.5 (Flaum,
J., concurring). Judge Flaum's opinion, however, suggests that while this holding
is correct, its reasoning should rest on other grounds. He felt that the federal
statutes in question only applied to aircraft users and not to fees charged to con-
cessionaires. Id. at 1274. Moreover, "the federal statute merely restricts the air-
port's overall profit, while not imposing any restrictions on those from whom
costs may be recovered." Id. at 1274 n.5. This would give support to the powers
of proprietors exercised in Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport
Auth., 825 F.2d 367 (11 th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes
115-122 and accompanying text.
- 562 F. Supp. 951 (D. Guam 1982). The airport imposed the fees through the
airlines and not directly on passengers. Id. at 953.
-o Id. at 957. Guam is under the authority of section 2210, section 1305, and
the Federal Anti-Head Tax Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2210, 1305, 1513 (1988). For a
discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 3-38 and accompanying text. Guam is
therefore subject to the prohibition of "head taxes" on passengers traveling in
interstate commerce. The court, however, did not find these airport charges pre-
empted. The court reasoned that, since Congress did not include airport terminal
buildings and facilities in appropriations passed concurrently with the head-tax
ban, the legislature did not intend to deprive airports of assessing and collecting
the necessary funds to finance such terminals. Since the charges in question here
were for that very purpose, the court concluded that they were not preempted.
Island Aviation, 562 F. Supp. at 957.
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arriving passengers. 0 1
In determining whether these fees were reasonable, the
District Court of Guam concluded that a reasonable fee
reflects the actual costs of facilities and makes the airport
as self-sustaining as possible. 10 2 The Guam authority's
formula, based on the number of passengers using its
services, met this test. On the other hand, the formulas
used by the Massachusetts and Indianapolis authorities
made those airports self-sustaining, but the fees imposed
by the authorities did not reflect the actual cost of main-
taining the airport facilities. Instead, some airport users
were favored over others. Therefore, the cost-allocation
formulas imposed at Logan and Indianapolis did not pass
the reasonableness test required by the federal statutes.
The idea that proprietor-imposed fees are only reason-
able when they accurately reflect the cost of maintaining
the airport is also the basis of American Airlines, Inc. v. Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority. '0 3 In that case, the First Circuit up-
held a landing fee structure which radically changed the
existing fee system.'0 4 Massport imposed new landing
fees on airlines that constituted a 52% increase over the
existing fee structure, resulting in a $4.2 million increase
in revenue. 0 5 Of that increase, over half covered the fi-
nancing of three costly airport undertakings. 0 6 One was
a runway extension project abandoned because of envi-
ronmental difficulties, another was the filling of a tidal
area to be used for future development, and the third was
an agreement to pay a local hospital one million dollars
over a period of ten years in exchange for disaster assist-
ance. 10 7 After noting these facts, the court turned to an
1, Island Aviation, 562 F. Supp. at 957.
102 Id. at 959.
0- 560 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1977).
1 4 Id. at 1038.
105 Id. at 1037.
106 Id. The airlines felt the projects, totalling $46 million, were of little or no
use to them. Id.
107 Id. at 1037-38. The runway extension project was halted because of state
environmental litigation and converted into "extended runway safety areas." The
tidal area development was initiated at the request of the airlines for the purpose
analysis of whether the new fees were reasonable.
In order to determine if the fees imposed by Massport
were reasonable, the court looked to the three part rea-
sonableness test enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v.
Delta Airlines, Inc. 108 The first question is whether the fee
discriminates against interstate commerce or travel. 10 9
The second question is whether the fee fairly reflects the
approximate value that users of airport facilities receive in
relation to each other."0 The final question is whether
the fee is excessive in relation to the actual cost borne by
the taxing body."' The court determined that Massport's
fees satisfied all of these tests and were, therefore, reason-
able."12 While the court was careful to limit its holding, it
agreed that airport proprietors could impose fees on
users for expenses resulting in dubious benefits so long as
the airport incurred the expenses while undertaking rele-
vant airport operations and so long as the fees were fairly
consonant with costs.1 3 This rule is best characterized as
a requirement of fair allocation of costs."t 4
of constructing cargo storage and other support facilities. The disaster assistance
proceeds were paid to East Boston Neighborhood Health Center. Id.
108 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (holding that a tax of one dollar per airline passenger
does not violate the federal Constitution). The Evansville test is limited to deter-
mining the reasonableness of burdens on interstate commerce and is not control-
ling outside this area. American Airlines, 560 F.2d at 1038.
109 Evansville, 405 U.S. at 717.
110 Id.
- Id. at 719.
112 American Airlines, 560 F.2d at 1038. The plaintiffs agreed that the Massport
landing fees passed the first two tests of not discriminating against interstate com-
merce (as distinguished from intrastate commerce) and of being formulated fairly
(based on aircraft weight). The court further rejected the airlines' contention that
the landing fee was excessive in relation to the benefit conferred because the ben-
efit was determined based on the cost of the construction of facilities versus the
amount of the tax, and not on the utility of the project to the individual user. Id.
1is Id. at 1039. The court stated, "This is not to say that states can run wild and
tax users for all extravagances. The facilities must be relevant to the operation of
the airport." Id.
,,4 See Indianapolis Airport, 733 F.2d at 1277 (Flaum,J., concurring). Although in
Indianapolis Airport the fair allocation of costs involved allocating expenses be-
tween distinct airport tenants, it is appropriate to assume a fair allocation of costs
involving airport development projects would make fees imposed to recover those
expenditures reasonable.
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Landing fees are not the only method an airport propri-
etor may use to meet operating expenses. Proprietors
may also impose fees on businesses whose customers can
be traced to the airport. These fees can still be imposed
even if the business is not located on the airport premises.
Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Author-
ity 115 addresses this very issue. In Alamo, the airport au-
thority sought to meet its operating expenses and other
costs through a schedule of user fees." t6 As part of its fee
structure, the airport levied a monthly fee on hotel cour-
tesy vehicles. 1 7 The airport also imposed a fee on cour-
tesy vehicles of car rental companies not located on
airport property equalling ten percent of all gross busi-
ness receipts from the rental of cars by passengers picked
up at the airport." 8 Alamo, an off-site rental agency, op-
posed the fee.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit judged
the ability of the airport to impose the fee on a highly def-
erential standard: the fee was reasonable if rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest." 9  The airport
authority offered two justifications for its fees. 20  First,
since the authority received no concession fee when a cus-
tomer of a rental agency rented a car off-site as it did
when a car was rented on-site, the authority sought to re-
store that lost revenue by assessing the user fee. Second,
the authority sought to maximize its revenues by impos-
ing the fee on off-site rental agencies.' 2' The court held
- 825 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987).
116 Id. at 369. The authority imposed fees on many activities conducted at the
airport's facilities, including parking fees, landing fees, rent from restaurants and
gift shops, and fees paid by taxis and limousines servicing the airport. Id.
117 Id. The fees imposed were a monthly courtesy vehicle fee of $50 or $100
depending on the vehicle's size, or a yearly fee of $800 per vehicle. Id.
1,i Id. One feature of the resulting fee was that the user fee for many of the
rental agencies greatly exceeded the flat fee applicable to hotels and motels. Id.
19 Id. at 370.
120 Id. at 373. The interest of the airport authority in raising revenue is a legiti-
mate and substantial government objective and was especially strong in this case
because state law required airports to meet all their expenses not covered by gov-
ernment grants through the collection of user fees. Id.
121 Id. Off-site car rental agencies were only required to pay ten percent of pro-
the fees were valid. Since all car rental companies re-
ceived benefits from the presence of the airport, the deci-
sion to establish a fee for off-airport companies was not
unreasonable, particularly because the fee only applied to
customers who could be attributed to the airport. 1 2
The key idea underlying the result in Alamo was the air-
port authority's purpose to become a self-sustaining air-
port. The authority did not seek to gain revenue
surpluses as the Indianapolis airport had attempted to do
in Indianapolis Airport.'2 3 The fact that the court upheld as
reasonable the imposition of user fees on businesses not
even located on airport property is testimony that the im-
portant inquiry with regard to reasonableness is whether
the fees are an accurate reflection of costs incurred by the
proprietor. Fees that do not accurately reflect proprietary
costs are unreasonable and therefore are preempted by
federal statutes.
2. Restricted Areas
The final aspect in determining reasonableness relates
to the ability of proprietors to entirely restrict access to
their facilities. While such a restriction may not be per-
manent, it is possible for an airport proprietor to com-
pletely deny a class of users access for a temporary period.
In Midway Airlines, Inc. v. County of Westchester,124 Midway
sought access to Westchester County Airport so that it
could conduct flights to Chicago. 125 The county usually
approved such requests in a two step process. First, there
was a technical review to assure that arrangements for
ground services, coordination of air schedules, and satis-
ceeds collected from customers arriving from the airport. In contrast, on-site
rental agencies were required to pay the ten percent charge on all customers. Id.
122 Id. at 374. The court held that, "Although this fee may harm off-airport
competition in general and Alamo's profitability in particular, the fee schedule
withstands constitutional scrutiny." Id.
" 733 F.2d at 1262. For a discussion of Indianapolis Airport, see supra notes 89-
98 and accompanying text.
124 584 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
125 Id. at 437. Midway proposed three departures from Westchester to Chicago
and three arrivals from Chicago each weekend. Id. at 438 n.9.
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factory noise limitations were all satisfied. Second, there
was a final approval by the county board. 26 Realizing that
the airport already operated at a capacity beyond its
means, 27 the county suspended the processing of all ac-
cess applications and, thus, temporarily denied Midway's
access request. 128
The response of the district court was conciliatory. It
first pointed out that the county had not denied Midway's
application but merely deferred it and that such deferral
was motivated by concerns for the safety of passengers in
the overcrowded terminal.' 29 Although the airport was
under federal mandate to make its facilities available on
reasonable terms and without discrimination, no federal
law prohibited the county from temporarily refusing to
grant access to its terminal. 30 The court held that a rea-
sonable period of time should be allowed for the county
to study the problem and develop rational and nondis-
criminatory rules for allocating scarce space.' 3 ' The
court, however, stressed that the deferral was limited to a
reasonable period of time and could not be extended
indefinitely. 3 2
126 Id. at 438. Midway applied for access in late 1983, although at the time it
had no arrangements for passenger service, ticketing, ground control, or over-
night parking of its aircraft. Id. at 438-39.
127 Id. at 439. The court related the following:
[T]here is only one small terminal equipped to handle flights by Part
121 air carriers; during peak hours of 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. on week nights "so many passengers are currently
booked on departing flights that it is often impossible to even enter the
building"; at such times there are "lines extending from ticket coun-
ters out into the street"; and the situation is even worse in holiday
periods. At least one of Midway's proposed scheduled flights, if ap-
proved, would depart during peak hours.
ld.
28 Id. This response was motivated by a need for new information relating to
increased demand for the use of the county airport. Id.
1'29 Id. at 440. The court recognized that the airport had an obligation to pro-
tect the health, welfare, and safety of the county residents. Id. at 437.
30 Id. at 440. The court believed the time should be used to develop nondis-
criminatory rules for allocating landing and takeoff slots, consistent with environ-
mental and safety needs. Id.
13, Id. at 441.
1"2 Id. The court, perhaps unwilling to leave to a later decision the meaning of
COMMENTS
The allowance of time to study access requests appears
to be a reasonable denial of access. In at least one other
instance, a court has granted an airport proprietor a rea-
sonable period of time to study a proposed access re-
quest. The grant came as part of a pair of rulings
delivered by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1977.
The first case, British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey [Concorde 1],1s concerned a decision by
the authority to temporarily ban Concorde flights at John
F. Kennedy International Airport. Prior to the application
for Concorde landing rights, the authority had noise re-
strictions in place. 34 The Concorde, a joint venture by
the British and French, was at first believed to create noise
levels in excess of the maximum allowed by the author-
ity. 3 5 Before commencing flights, the operators of the
airplane applied to the FAA for permission to land at
American airports, and the Secretary of Transportation
agreed to allow flights for sixteen months for the purpose
of determining the noise impact.1 3 6 Although the Secre-
tary had the power to require Dulles Airport, operated by
the FAA, to allow the Concorde to land, he could not pre-
empt the New York and New Jersey Port Authority from
excluding the airplane pursuant to a reasonable and non-
discriminatory noise regulation. 3 7  The authority re-
"reasonable," allowed thirty days for completion of the usage study and another
twenty days for rules to be promulgated. Id.
558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 79. Beginning in 1955, the port authority had determined a specific
level of maximum noise allowable for airplanes using its facilities. Careful study
had set the level at 112 PNdB (perceived noise in decibels). Id.
1- Id. The developers of the Concorde were actually well aware of how impor-
tant minimizing noise was. Although the Concorde required enormous thrust to
propel the craft at speeds in excess of the speed of sound, the technicians hoped
to keep the engine noise below that of the noisiest subsonic aircraft. Over $100
million was spent just to moderate the noise of the Concorde. Id.
1 ld. at 79-80. The landing rights of the Concorde could be revoked immedi-
ately in the event of an emergency. Also, the airplane had to observe a curfew
from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. and abide by noise abatement procedures prescribed by
the FAA. Id. at 80.
1-5 Id. at 81. The Secretary stated:
The situation with respect to JFK may be complicated by the fact
that under federal policy that has hitherto prevailed a local airport
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sponded to the Secretary's decision by banning the
Concorde from Kennedy for six months while noise levels
were studied at Dulles Airport. 38
The issue before the court was whether the Secretary's
decision to allow a testing period for the Concorde pre-
empted the authority's power to ban the airplane.'" 9
Although the appeals court held against the federal pre-
emption, it remanded the case to determine if the delay by
the authority in studying the noise problem was unreason-
able. '4 If the delay was found to be unreasonable, the
court instructed the authority to promulgate new noise re-
strictions with dispatch.' 4'
Three months later, the issue was again before the
court of appeals in British Airways Board v. Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey [Concorde I/].142 The court en-
joined further prohibition of Concorde operations at Ken-
nedy until the port authority could develop a reasonable,
nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory noise regulation
equally applicable to all aircraft. 143 In its ruling, the court
noted that the Concorde had proven it could meet the old
noise limitations that Kennedy had kept in place since
1955, but the craft had not been given the opportunity to
proprietor has had authority under certain circumstances to refuse
landing rights. If for any legitimate and legally binding reason it
should turn out that theJFK part of the demonstration could not go
forward . . . that would obviously be extremely unfortunate and
would greatly diminish, but in my opinion it would not destroy, the
validity of the demonstration.
Id.
'I." Id. The authority also indicated it would study noise level reports at Charles
DeGaulle and Heathrow airports in Europe. Id.
'.-1 Id. While there was no preemption, the court did discuss why noise regula-
tion was left to a single airport authority and not to the local municipalities near
the airport. The court said, "The likelihood of multiple, inconsistent rules would
be a dagger pointed at the heart of commerce-and the rule applied might come
literally to depend on which way the wind was blowing." Id. at 83.
140 Id. at 86. The central inquiry was into the reasonableness of the 13-month
delay that had already occurred. Id.
141 Id.
142 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
14- Id. at 1005.
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demonstrate this to the authority. 44 Instead, following
the court's order to promulgate a noise-level rule with
dispatch, the authority had voted to extend indefinitely
the temporary ban it had earlier imposed on Concorde
flights.' 45 While there was no standard for an inquiry into
whether reasonable dispatch was being attempted, the
court felt it should be able to examine the process the au-
thority was following to determine if it was likely to
achieve results in the foreseeable future. 146 The court
then chastised the authority for abusing the leeway it had
been granted and issued a ruling in favor of Concorde
flights. 147
The decisions that have been discussed demonstrate
the dilemma an airport proprietor faces when it attempts
to exercise control over an airport facility but must com-
ply with the federal requirement that any restrictions be
reasonable. When a proprietor imposes fees on airport
users, fees that do not accurately reflect costs incurred by
the proprietor or those that are not fairly allocated among
airport users are unreasonable, and therefore they are
14 Id. at 1006. The Concorde could consistently meet a 109 PNdB standard.
In fact, it was shown to be less annoying than a Boeing 707. Also, further testing
in January of 1976 showed that fewer individuals than originally believed would
be adversely affected by the introduction of the Concorde at JFK. Id.
141 Id. at 1009. The authority had no more basis for its decision than the evi-
dence known for years, that the Concorde had "unique characteristics." Id.
'" Id. at 1012. The court stated:
While there are no absolute standards by which it may be deter-
mined that an inquiry is not being conducted with reasonable dis-
patch, a court will closely scrutinize the nature and character of the
problems before the agency to assess whether the path it has chosen
to pursue will resolve those issues in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
Id. The court also said, "Our holding, however, does not deny the Port Authority
the power to adopt a new, uniform and reasonable noise standard in the future."
Id. at 1013.
147 Id. at 1010. The court said:
If ever there was a case in which a major technological advance was
in imminent danger of being studied into obsolescence, this is it.
There comes a time when relegating the solution of an issue to the
indefinite future can so sap petitioners of hope and resources that a
failure to resolve the issue within a reasonable period is tantamount
to refusing to address it at all.
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federally preempted. When a proprietor denies access to
his facility, he may do so temporarily, but the length of
the denial period is also subject to a reasonableness test.
Therefore, reasonableness is an important component in
the determination of whether an airport proprietor's re-
strictions are valid.
B. Nondiscrimination
While reasonableness is a quintessential inquiry when
determining whether a restriction is valid or not, a restric-
tion must also be nondiscriminatory in nature. Discrimi-
nation can occur either in the form of a burden on
interstate commerce in favor of intrastate travel or in the
form of giving a preference to commercial aviation over
general aviation. Sometimes nondiscrimination is insepa-
rable from reasonableness. One case which demon-
strates how courts apply the requirement for
nondiscrimination is Indianapolis Airport Authority v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 148 Here, the Seventh Circuit determined
that an airport fee system was both unreasonable and dis-
criminatory. The airport authority forced commercial avi-
ation and airport concessionaires to pay rental and user
fees to cover the costs those tenants imposed on the air-
port. General aviation users paid for their share through
a flowage fee on aviation fuel sold at the airport.1 4 9 The
court recognized the fact that even though the imposition
of a landing fee on general aviation would not be cost ef-
fective, the system the authority used was
discriminatory. ' 50
While general aviation had been assessed a cost of
733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
14) Id. at 1271. General aviation is defined as "civil aviation that does not in-
volve transportation for hire of passengers or cargo nor the ferrying of aircraft."
Therefore, the use of small private airplanes for personal or recreational use is
included by the term. New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 163 n.17.
15o Indianapolis Airport, 733 F.2d at 1271. The court noted that if general avia-
tion paid its costs through a landing fee rather than a flowage fee, the costs associ-
ated with collecting the revenue would be as high as one half of the proceeds
collected. Id.
$400,000 for its use of the airport, the flowage fee yielded
only $250,000 in revenues.'"' This result meant that
while commercial aviation was paying more than its share
of costs to the facility, general aviation was paying about
half the costs it imposed. Since private airplanes were
more likely than commercial aircraft to travel intrastate,
the effect of the flowage fee system was to shift intrastate
costs to interstate users. 52 The court felt that Congress
intended to prevent discrimination against interstate com-
merce in favor of intrastate travelers. 153 Therefore, the
airport proprietor could not continue to impose its ex-
isting fee system.
While a flowage fee may be perfectly valid if effectively
allocated, 54 a fee structured like that in Indianapolis is void
because of its discriminatory effect. Most issues of dis-
crimination are not as clear-cut as in Indianapolis, however,
and few courts base their holdings on the sole fact that a
particular airport regulation is discriminatory in nature.
Furthermore, not all discriminatory statutes involve dis-
crimination between interstate and intrastate travel. 55
The issues of discrimination and reasonableness are
151 Id. While the landing fees for airlines at the airport had nearly doubled, the
authority left the flowage fee paid by general aviation unchanged. That fee had
been in effect for nine years. Id.
152 Id.
-53 Id.
-5 Id. The court had no objection to substituting a flowage fee for a landing fee
to economize the costs of collection, but it believed the flowage fee had to yield
revenues equivalent to the costs allocated to general aviation's use of the airport.
The Indianapolis fee did not do this. Id.
155 Indeed, if the entire question of discrimination turned on whether intrastate
commerce was being favored at the expense of interstate commerce, there would
have been no need to pass federal statutes proscribing such discrimination. In
the absence of a significant need for the exercise of state police powers, the dor-
mant commerce clause would be authoritative. See Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating an Iowa law restricting the
length of trucks capable of using highways within the state because of its marginal
increase in safety); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidat-
ing an Arizona law regulating train lengths because of the law's marginal increase
in safety). See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the authority to
regulate interstate commerce). Discrimination, therefore, must also encompass
other aspects; the most likely being a proscription of favoring one airport user
over another.
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frequently interconnected. In Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey, 156 Arrow took issue with local
noise control regulations that prevented it from operating
DC-8 aircraft atJohn F. Kennedy International Airport. 57
The authority, however, granted Icelandair an exemption
from those same noise requirements, enabling that airline
to operate noncomplying BAC 111, B 737, and DC-9 air-
craft at all of the port authority's facilities. 58 In order to
determine whether the authority's rule discriminated on
its face between Arrow and Icelandair, the court adopted
a test for discrimination encompassing elements of "rea-
sonableness" and the presumption that the restriction was
valid so long as it was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.'5 9 The establishment of "reasonable" pro-
cedures by the authority to determine the acceptable level
of aircraft noise satisfied the court's inquiry into both rea-
sonableness and nondiscrimination. 60  Since the airport
authority had satisfied those requirements,' 16  the court
16 602 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding noise restrictions imposed by
the Authority).
1-7 Id. at 319. The DC-8 (60 series) is referred to as a State 1 aircraft. The port
authority imposed noise level restrictions, effective January 1, 1985, that required
the use of muted State 2 or 3 aircraft. Id. at 316.
'." Id. at 320. For a discussion of the procedure required to receive an exemp-
tion to the noise level restrictions in place at the airport, see infra note 161.
. Id. at 319-21. This test is applied to local economic regulations. Id. at 320.
'6 Id. at 321.
I61 d. Additonal factors weighed in favor of the airport authority. First, Ice-
landair had been granted the only exception to the noise regulations set in place
by the authority, and that occurred at the specific request of the United States
Department of State because of "international policy considerations." Id. at 320.
Those policy considerations included the strategic significance of maintaining the
only direct service between the United States and Iceland where important mili-
tary and equipment installations are located. Id. The regulations promulgated by
the airport authority and met by Icelandair were that: (1) the carrier must provide
the sole scheduled passenger service between New York and a foreign country
with New York being the primary service to the United States; (2) the FAA must
have exempted the carrier from federal noise regulations; (3) the United States
government must request the port authority to grant an exemption based on "for-
eign relations and national security" grounds; and, (4) the carrier must enter into
an agreement with the port authority providing that it will obtain and utilize any
conforming aircraft in its fleet atJFK to the extent such aircraft can reasonably be
used for such service. Id.
The second factor in the authority's favor was expert testimony showing that,
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determined that the discrimination was interrelated with
reasonableness.
Even more demonstrative examples of the limited non-
discrimination requirement and its interdependence on
reasonableness occurred in City of Houston v. FAA 162 and
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. 163 In City of Houston,' 64 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a
perimeter rule imposed by the FAA which prohibited air
carriers from operating nonstop flights between Washing-
ton National and any airport more than 1000 miles
away.165 The FAA, acting as the proprietor of National,
imposed the rule as a means of controlling the increasing
air traffic at National and diverting it to Dulles Interna-
tional Airport. 66 The court held that an airport proprie-
tor may make reasonable regulations concerning the
efficient use of navigable airspace, and National's perime-
ter rule constituted an acceptable means of promoting
although Icelandair's aircraft were outside the noise control regulation standards,
its aircraft were quieter than those Arrow desired to utilize. Id. at 320-21.
,62 679 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1982).
16, 658 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1006 (1988).
'- City of Houston is also an excellent example of the creativity federal judges
and their clerks can show. The text sections are divided into amusing titles like
"One If By Land, Two If By Sea, and Three If By Air," "Scope of Review-We're
the Administrative Agency, Doing What We Do Best," "Authority, Authority,
Who's Got the Authority?," and "Have Perimeter Rule, Will Travel." The parties
to the case are listed on "the passenger manifest." Id. at 1186. The opinion also
describes Washington D.C. as:
Nestled in the green hills of the Mid-Atlantic region, snug and smug
along the banks of the beautiful Potomac River, this celebrated town
of "Northern charm and Southern efficiency" offers visitors a pot-
pourri of museums, art galleries, monuments, historic sites, parks,
Panda bears, politicians, and a climate that is charitably described as
ghastly.
Id.
16. Id. at 1187. The traveler living beyond 1000 miles had two choices of air
transportation to Washington: changing planes in a city less than 1000 miles from
National or flying directly to Dulles International or Baltimore-Washington Air-
port. Dulles, however, is a thirty-mile taxi ride from the city. Id.
'- Id. at 1188. No operational or safety considerations were cited in the rule.
Three reasons were cited by the FAA: (1) to assure the full utilization of Dulles,
(2) to preserve National's status as a short- and medium-haul airport, and (3) to
eliminate the inequity of a prior 650-mile rule that contained exceptions for cer-
tain cities. Id.
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that efficiency. 16 7  Additionally, any discrimination be-
tween travelers located within the perimeter and travelers
located outside it was merely incidental and not a basis for
declaring the rule unconstitutional. 6  Thus, so long as
National's perimeter rule was reasonable, the court would
not find it invalid because of its discriminatory effects.
Western Air Lines involved a perimeter rule similar to the
one in City of Houston. In Western Air Lines the port author-
ity had imposed a ban on all flights arriving at LaGuardia
Airport from more than 1500 miles away in an attempt to
relieve congestion at LaGuardia by diverting traffic to the
larger Kennedy and Newark airports. An airline alleged it
was being unfairly burdened by the rule. 69 In reaching
its decision, the district court placed much weight on the
fact that long-distance air traffic was not prohibited from
entering New York area airports but was only diverted
from one airport to another. 7 0 It also noted the similarity
between the FAA's use of a perimeter rule to divert air
traffic to Dulles in City of Houston and the New York and
New Jersey Port Authority's rule diverting traffic away
from LaGuardia.' 7' The court noted that while all regula-
167 Id. at 1196.
'- Id. at 1198. The court said:
The accident of geography, not any deliberate discrimination against
the western states, underlies the FAA's rule. The perimeter does
not discriminate against a named state or states. It does not declare
that Texans may not fly nonstop to National. Rather, it sets a limit
of 1000 miles on nonstop flights. Some states, e.g. Louisiana, strad-
dle the line. Some Louisiana airports meet the requirement, others
do not. Just as the Rocky Mountain states possess beautiful scenery,
Texas its reservoirs of oil and natural gas, and California its sandy
beaches, so the accident of geography places some states within
1000 miles of National and others beyond. The perimeter rule,
which for geographic reasons has an incidental effect on air travel
from certain states, does not thereby violate the Constitution.
Id. But see Comment, supra note 58 (suggesting that the perimeter rule imposed
on Love Field is unconstitutional).
169 Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 953. LaGuardia occupies 662 acres, Newark
2300 acres, and Kennedy 4930 acres. Neither Newark nor Kennedy has a perime-
ter restriction. Id.
170 Id. at 957-58.
171 Id. The court said, "This Court sees no real distinction between the FAA's
interest, as proprietor of an airport system, to manage its congestion problems by
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tions tend to discriminate in some way, the important in-
quiry is whether the discrimination is reasonable in light
of the legitimate objectives the proprietor seeks to
achieve. 72 After noting that the control of ground con-
gestion is a legitimate proprietary function, the court
agreed with the authority's belief that the perimeter rule
would keep LaGuardia from experiencing delays and
congestion. 173
Western Air Lines and City of Houston demonstrate that the
requirements of reasonableness and nondiscrimination
are interrelated. The cases also demonstrate that it is pos-
sible for airport proprietors to comply with federal stat-
utes in promulgating regulations. So long as an airport
proprietor can show legitimate objectives, especially
through empirical studies, neither limits of reasonable-
ness nor discrimination will stand in the way of proprie-
tary regulations.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF REASONABLENESS AND
NONDISCRIMINATION
Cases describing the validity of proprietor restrictions
are of little use to airport operators without a synthesis of
suggested limits. The meaning of reasonableness and
nondiscrimination must, therefore, be studied to provide
guidelines for airport proprietors to follow. First, propri-
etors must understand what areas they may not regulate
because of exclusive control by the federal government.
Next, proprietors must understand the allowable methods
of exerting proprietary control. Finally, they must know
the limits of those methods.
As noted earlier, the areas available for proprietary con-
trol include noise control, congestion, and recovery of op-
use of a perimeter rule, and the interest of the Port Authority, as proprietor of
LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark, to do the same." Id.
112 Id. at 959. The court cited an alternative analysis as, "whether that discrimi-
nation is unjust." Id.
17. Id. The court cited studies showing LaGuardia was operating near or above
its capacity levels and delays were occurring because of that congestion. Id.
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erating costs.' 74  The essential determination of what
areas a proprietor may control, especially where the pro-
prietor is also a state governmental entity, turns on
whether the restrictions and fees adopted are promul-
gated under proprietary powers or under police pow-
ers. 75  Where police powers are being exercised, the
court will consider restrictions enacted pursuant to those
police powers void and preempted by federal regula-
tions. 76 On the other hand, where an airport operator is
functioning under proprietary powers, courts will allow
restrictions and fee impositions to stand, provided those
regulations have been enacted by proper means. 77
The proper method of promulgating proprietor-im-
posed restrictions and fees is important to their validity.
Courts will not allow restrictions that have been carelessly
considered and formulated. 17  But, where a legitimate
method of formulation or promulgation has been utilized,
the court will allow the proprietor's decisions to stand. 179
Such discretion means that in the area of costs, an airport
operator who has allocated expenses fairly between po-
tential airport users will be allowed to extract those costs
even from users who have no facilities located at the air-
114 For a discussion of proprietary power to relieve airport congestion and re-
cover operational expenses, see supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
17-, See United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786, 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (discussing the fact that a curfew imposed by an airport was an unlawful
exercise of police powers); see also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624, 635 n.14 (1973) (discussing the fact that an inquiry into proprietary
powers was not equivalent to an inquiry into an exercise of police powers).
176 See County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. at 797-98.
177 See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 658 F. Supp. 952,
956 (discussing the fact that proprietary power exists for airport operators to im-
pose some restrictions and upholding a perimeter rule enacted by the proprietors
of LaGuardia airport), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1006 (1988).
178 See New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157,
169-70 (1st Cir. 1989) (invalidating a landing fee scheme that was not scientifically
derived).
179 See Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 305 F. Supp.
93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding a $25 landing fee during peak periods). Peak pe-
riod landing fees are often discussed as a means of efficiently utilizing scarce facili-
ties. See R. EXERT, supra note 62, at 47-58.
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port. ' ° A proprietor who has not allocated expenses
fairly will not be able to impose those unfair costs, even
upon the tenants of his facility. 81
The discretion given proprietors in the area of conges-
tion resembles the discretion they are given in recovering
costs. Landing fees calculated by a nontraditional method
of allocating costs between fixed costs and those varying
by weight of the airplane have been held invalid. 8 ' Land-
ing fees based on legitimate allocations, however, have
been upheld even though they might favor commercial
aviation over general aviation 83 and otherwise appear
discriminatory. Thus, the method of determining restric-
tions by an airport proprietor provides the basis of deter-
mining whether or not those restrictions are allowable.
The question still remains: what are the limits on re-
strictions that are neither preempted nor determined by
improper methods? In this area reasonableness and non-
discrimination play key roles. As the Supreme Court has
indicated, one test of reasonableness is whether the costs
imposed on the user are related to the benefit con-
ferred.'8 4 Once this requirement is satisfied, whether the
benefits are of dubious utility to the users who pay for
them is irrelevant so long as the airport proprietor ex-
pends funds in a way that is not frivolous or unreasona-
ble. 8 5 The requirement of nondiscrimination is satisfied
180 See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367
(1 th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of a valid fee structure imposed on facilities
located off airport premises, see supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
is' See Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262 (7th
Cir. 1984). For a discussion of an invalid fee structure imposed on airport ten-
ants, see supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
182 See New England Legal Found., 833 F.2d at 157. For a discussion of an invalid
fee scheme based on a nontraditional method of rates, see supra notes 73-88 and
accompanying text.
,83 See Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n, 305 F. Supp. at 93.
184 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707, 719 (1972). This is the third prong of a three-prong test. The other two
prongs (whether there is discrimination against interstate commerce or travel and
whether there is a fair approximation for the benefit conferred) are not really ap-
plicable when preemption by a federal statute is at issue. Id. at 717.
185 American Airlines, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 560 F.2d 1036 (lst Cir.
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if there is no bias in favor of commercial aviation over
general aviation or if the rules causing such a bias are
neither arbitrary nor based on nontraditional proce-
dures.' 8 6 Where proprietor-imposed restrictions are not
preempted and are based on accepted methodology, then
the fact that they are neither discriminatory nor unreason-
able is sufficient evidence to convince courts to uphold
them.
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice Jackson noted, there is little aviation law that
has not been preempted by the federal government.18 7
The area left open to airport proprietors in setting restric-
tions and fees is no exception to that preemption. The
airport system today faces problems affecting the environ-
ment and the public. The system must also deal with de-
creasing availability of funds from the federal
government. Proprietors must utilize what freedom they
do have in controlling the use of their facilities to further
the interests of everyone involved. While air traffic and
the demand for facilities increase daily, airport operators
confront local economies that may not be capable of gen-
erating enough airport revenue to support those facilities.
If these two factors surface at any single airport, its opera-
tors must impose restrictions on access and utilize alter-
native methods of raising funds. Here lies the dilemma.
1977) (upholding fees covering expenditures advanced for legitimate airport
objectives).
.. Compare New England Legal Found., 833 F.2d at 157 with Aircraft Owners & Pilots
Ass'n, 305 F. Supp. at 93. In both cases there was a bias in favor of commercial
aviation over general aviation, but the court found the system used in New England
Legal Found. invalid because it was not scientifically derived. The system in Aircraft
Owners & Pilots Ass'n, however, was valid because it merely imposed a flat landing
fee during peak periods. Since Massport's fee scheme was held void because it
was not based on scientifically derived information and New York's fee scheme
was held valid in spite of the fact it was meant to discriminate against smaller air-
craft, perhaps the basis of the formulation is the central issue in determining
reasonableness.
1.7 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). For Justice Jackson's comments on the pervasiveness of federal regula-
tion, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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As public servants, the operators are obligated to con-
sider, not only the measures they will implement to
achieve their goals, but also the effect of those measures
and whether they remain in the jurisdiction of proprietary
control. With reflection and care, a proprietor can im-
pose restrictions that do not conflict with federal preemp-
tion, that are based on established methodologies, and
that are not void due to unreasonableness or discrimina-
tion. When this objective is accomplished, the country
will be better able to maintain an efficient and equitable
air transportation system.

